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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on Belarus in order to find explanation as to why could Lukashenko remain the 
authoritarian leader of Belarus, while in Ukraine the position of the political elite had proved less 
stable and collapsed in 2004. We seek to determine whether the internal factors (macroeconomic 
conditions, standard of living, the oppressive nature of the political system) play a significant role in 
the operation of the domino effect. This article emphasises the determining role of immanent internal 
factors, thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained by the role of the suppressing political 
regime, the hindrance of democratic rights and the relatively good living conditions that followed the 
transformational recession. Whilst in Ukraine, the markedly different circumstances brought forth the 
success of the Orange Revolution. 
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The political and economical transition of the Post-Soviet states has been far from a straightforward 
change into democracy and market economy. The differences in the methods of designing the 
transformation were recognizable by the mid 1990’s (Portes 1994). The “traps” and difficulties of 
transformation have been evident since then. The authoritarian regimes of a number of the region’s 
countries have recently collapsed, like in Georgia, Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan. Social discontent, which 
proved to be one of the major catalysts of the changes in these countries, has not gone large-scale in 
Belarus yet. Why is the power of the Belarus elite stronger than that of other elites in the process of 
democratisation? If the transition is regarded as an elite-driven process, the question arises: just how 
much it is because of the oppressing nature of the regime, and to what extent can it be explained by 
economic recession, or its effects on society. 
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In this essay we focus on Ukraine and Belarus, the two largest Western neighbours of Russia, in order 
to find an explanation as to why Alexander Lukashenko was able to remain in power while in Ukraine 
the power of the elite had proven to be weaker and collapsed at the end of 2004. According to this 
study, the accumulation of political and societal discontent and the existence of the forums and 
institutions articulating these views have together made the political changes possible by the end of 
2004. In Belarus, due to the restricted access to the democratic forums and the internal support of the 
political elite, which stems from the relatively good economic results of the country, meant that the 
force of the social movements has been relatively weak. In other words, using Polanyi’s methodology, 
we can say that the Belarusian society in contrast with the Ukrainian has not had to respond in any 
way to the market impulses to protect itself (Polanyi 1942). In Belarus there has not been any strong 
pressure on the society to react against capitalism and transformation, nor any effective channels to 
influence the first period of transition. 
 
Transformation is a process that depends on three main groups of factors: the initial conditions, the 
policies pursued, and the external environment (Ellman 1994). Certain researchers point to external 
forces (see e.g. Vachudova 2006). The great power geopolitics and the political and economical 
support of Russia, the EU and the US, play an important role in the maintenance of the elite’s power 
or in the possible rise to power of the opposition. The domino effect theory, which has often been used 
for the analysis of the Cold War, can also be adopted for the process of transition; democratisation and 
distancing from the Russian influence (see e.g. Starr 1991; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Bunce and 
Wolchnik 2006; McFaul 2005). We do not deny the statements of path-dependency (Stark 1992; Stark, 
1995) and the importance of initial conditions (see Brabant 1998) but we presume that the similar 
initial conditions in the two countries do not influence the success of the transition processes. Some 
scholars have asserted that ethnicity has a great impact on the support of democratization and 
marketization in post-Soviet states (see e.g. Kuzio 2001a; Eke and Kuzio 2000). Their analyses say 
that ethnic Ukrainians, are more supportive of market economy and democracy than ethnic Russians 
and Belarusians. Other results focus on both internal and external political effect, but neglect the role 
of economic situation and social factors (see e.g. Way 2005; Way 2006). Nevertheless, we have to 
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pose the question: under similar geopolitical circumstances, which country is to be considered as a 
weak domino, and what are the internal factors that play a role in whether discontent can be articulated 
and result in political changes? This article emphasises the determining role of immanent internal 
factors, thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained by the role of the suppressing political 
regime, the hindrance of democratic rights and the relatively good living conditions that followed the 
transformational collapse, while in Ukraine, the markedly different circumstances brought forth 
success of the Orange Revolution. 
 
This essay is constituted from the following parts. Firstly, it is argued that the elites play a very 
prominent role in the transformation of the institutions, especially in the transitional period (see Szalai 
1996; Szalai 2001). With the economic approach presented here, we cast light on the fragility of the 
elites’ position, thus providing an economic explanation to their legitimacy. Secondly, we review the 
different types of economic channels the elite use to influence society and to the extent to which the 
society is aware of the importance of these channels. In the third part, we briefly touch upon the 
different modes of protests, their mechanisms and forms, through which the members of the society 
can articulate and mediate their preferences towards the elite. Following this, we analyse some key 
indicators of the so called perceived economy and figures of the standard of living, since, according to 
our hypothesis, the effect of the transition period on the standard of living is a main factor responsible 
for social discontent. The existence or non-existence of democratic institutions is a key factor of the 
society’s ability to mediate their needs or criticism towards the elite. Finally, we will attempt to predict 
what is going to happen in Belarusian politics. 
 
The elites’ institution-forming roles 
 
Elite-analyses of transforming economies depict the transitions as elite-governed processes (see 
Pigenko et al. 2003). These are in accordance with the observations of neo-institutionalism that in 
those countries or regions where organic, bottom-up and slower-paced institutional development was 
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not possible, the institutions have been installed in a top-to-bottom way, to the pattern of foreign 
examples. 
 
The intellectual elites of all the post-socialist countries aimed at the adoption of a democratic and 
market-economy establishment in order to be able to provide higher standards of living, cultural and 
political framework for their people. Even in Central Europe, where the democracies developed easier, 
the elites had a prominent role in the development of the foundations of democracy and the market 
economy. In Eastern Europe, where the process of democratization has some been slower and, may 
even have stopped altogether in some countries, and where, due to state property or the state’s 
bureaucratic regulatory mechanisms, the political elites have more influence on the economy it is 
unquestionable that the transformation is an elite-driven process. We can conclude that the ratio of the 
elite circulation and the elite reproduction1 influences “only” the quality of the resulting system, not 
the elite-driven nature of the transition (for a more detailed discussion, see Szelényi and Szelényi 
1995) 
 
In Belarus, the elite reproduction, moreover the elite continuity has not resulted in a markedly 
different political establishment, and the economic transition is in a strange borderline on the market 
economies typical of our region and that of state-dominated economy. It was not in the interests of the 
political elite to convert some of their political capital into economic capital, since they were able to 
retain their power even after the 1990’s and they could postpone the forming of the new establishment 
and the defining of the conversion ratios. 
 
The key players of the present Ukrainian political elite: Yulia Timoshenko, Viktor Yushchenko and 
Viktor Yanukovich have been in the forefront of Ukrainian politics for years and the Orange 
Revolution in 2004 merely rearranged the relative positions of the players. Since then we have 
witnessed the redistribution of power within this elite, but it seems none of the parties are able to expel 
the other from the political field for a long time. Nevertheless, the different economic lobbies bring a 
strong pressure on the principal actors of political life. 
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Due to the interpenetration and traversing between the elite groups we will not discriminate the 
different groups in this essay. Our approach is positionalist and stratificational. According to the 
former, we regard the elites as groups of individuals who are in the position of making decisions. The 
stratificational approach assumes that the installation of institutions is an top-down process and it is 
the elite in position of power who builds and monopolises the system. Although the relative autonomy 
of the institutions and their independence from their establishers is a subject to professional debate 
(Greven 1995), we assume that the institutions cannot be considered as autonomous agents since it is 
the individuals (the elite) who determine their character, quality, functions and limits. 
 
In spite of these, the economic results and their effects on society are only partly dependent on the 
system and institutions established and influenced by the elites. Geopolitics, external processes, the 
collapse of export markets and the transformational recession are all such external circumstances 
which are beyond the “action radius” of the elites. However, the elites, by their economic policy-
making influence the transition, and have an effect on the macroeconomic indicators, just as much as 
on redistribution or the ratio of income distribution, etc. 
 
From our point of view, the essence of this approach of examining the transition through economic 
performance is that economic development and the material prosperity of the society plays an 
important role in the consolidation of the transformed or newly-developed political system (see Plasser 
and Ulram 1995). Their share in shaping the political establishment, extending democratic rights, and 
creating political institutions is even larger, almost exclusive, especially where traditions of exerting 
social pressure are weaker, such as in Eastern Europe. 
 
The causes of social discontent and their elements of articulation 
 
We must therefore, investigate the ways the elite influence society, or in other words: what the 
economic, societal, and institutional factors affecting the social discontent that emerge in the process 
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of economic transition are. Political constraints and the resistance of society can influence the process 
of transition for many reasons (Roland 1994; Roland 1997). Even in the case of Ukraine and Belarus 
the autocratic regimes have to respect society: hurting every group and damaging the welfare of 
society leads to social discontent. Sanders (1995) argued that politicians have to distinguish real 
economy and perceived economy and other empirical studies (for example Niemi et al. 1999) showed 
the importance of perceived economy in elections. Society only perceives a fraction of the 
macroeconomic indicators of the transformational recession, for example the changes in real wages, 
inflation, economic growth, unemployment rate, the amount of GDP per capita and its growth rate. For 
the society, these factors are the indicators of perceived economy. 
 
The external or internal imbalances or structural problems, even if they are unsustainable in the long 
run, do not lead to social discontent until they have an effect (by a minor adjustment, economic shock 
therapy, or large-scale recession) on the perceived economy, that is on the factors mentioned above.2 
Nevertheless, the improvement of the unperceived indicators can actually have a deteriorating effect 
on the immediately perceivable indicators. Therefore, it seems advisable to focus on those 
macroeconomic indicators the society can perceive in the short-term, as these have an immediate 
effect on the social contentment/discontent and its manifestation. Greskovits (1995) argued that the 
manifestation of social discontent in transitional countries depends greatly on the structure of society, 
the effects of transition on society, as well as the political system of the country. 
 
The instruments used to express social discontent are fundamentally different in an established 
democracy and a dictatorship. In the former, many of the forms of discontent can be handled by the 
system while it does not touch upon the system’s foundations: democratic systems aid the interests of 
the majority which can also mean the replacement of the elite (e.g. with elections). In a dictatorship, 
the social discontent is directed at the ruling elite and the foundations of the system at the same time. 
The articulation forms of discontent are system-dependent: civil disobedience can only be efficient in 
a democracy (see Bence 1991) but it is ineffective in a dictatorial state. Revolution is the way to 
overthrow a dictatorship, and strikes are not an effective measure of social discontent either, if there 
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are no independent unions. Without over generalising in our association of forms of protest and 
political systems it must be admitted that in an authoritarian state the manifestation of social 
discontent is more difficult and can even be delayed in manifestation. Measuring it and the reliability 
of these measurements leave much to be desired. Moreover, the absence of democratic institutions is 
intended to cover up social discontent. This seriously restricts the methodology of the present essay: 
the traditional forms of protest and the figures representing these can only be used to measure social 
discontent with limitations. 
 
Transformational recession in Ukraine and Belarus 
 
All post-Soviet states suffered a major economic recession in the 1990s. The reasons, which were 
analysed in detail in the literature (see e. g. Williamson 1993; Fischer et al. 1997), are not important 
from our point of view. The gravity of the recession is unquestionable, but the question arises whether 
the Belarusian recession can be regarded as outstanding in the region. Is it possible to explain the 
measure of social discontent with the gravity of this recession, felt by the whole society? It seems 
helpful to compare the Belarusian and Ukrainian figures, as the downfall of the Ukrainian regime was 
largely due to economic reasons, and also because by comparing the two sets of figures we can avoid a 
possible mistaken conclusion arising from the fact that recession was deeper in Eastern Europe than in 
the Central European region. 
 
The Belarusian economy did not go through the fundamental structural changes in the last 15 years; 
the predomination of state property, the sectoral structure inherited from the Soviet system and the 
bureaucratic governance of the economy are still very typical. The liberalisation of prices, started in 
1992, as well as the initial impetus of privatisation, was stopped by an authoritarian intervention 
within a couple of years. (see Table 1. which  shows those macroeconomic indicators that are 
perceivable for the society in the short run.) 
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The data in Table 1. only reveals that the recession was of large-scale in both countries. Based on 
these data it cannot be confirmed that the political changes in Ukraine and Belarus can be linked with 
the degree of the recession. 
 
However, the reliability of the above data and the drawn conclusions should be approached with due 
caution. The mere difference between an inflation rate of 891.2% and another of 2,220.9% does not 
necessarily mean a difference in social discontent as well; more important is its effect on the level of 
real wages. Neither does the official unemployment rate reflect the real activity of the society on the 
labour market. Nevertheless, it’s worth comparing the development of GDP in the two countries (see 
Figure 1.). 
 
Data shows that the Belarusian economy has been on a growth path since 1996, while in Ukraine the 
economy only started to grow around the turn of the millennium. This suggests that the Ukrainian 
economy had been slower in getting over a greater transformational shock and thus it had posed a 
greater burden on the people. The Belarusian economy showed its worst performance in the middle of 
the 1990’s, the annual GDP in 1995 was at 2/3 of that of 1991 (in constant price level). According to 
the estimates, GDP will be 42% larger in 2007 than in 1991. In Ukraine, between 1992 and 2000 GDP 
was less than half of the 1991 level almost every year In Ukraine, until 2000 the GDP was less than 
half of the 1991’s level in almost every year. 
Regarding the GDP per capita in PPP (with 1996 as base year), similar conclusions can be drawn. The 
Belarusian GDP per capita has doubled between 1995 and 2003, while Ukrainian figures show a 
different pattern: between 1993 and 2003 the GDP per capita follows a U-shaped pattern, and the level 
of GDP was only slightly higher at the end of the period than ten years before (Penn World Table, 
2006). There is also a great difference between the two countries in the ratio of consumption to GDP. 
Since 2001, the value of this indicator has been above 60% in Belarus, while in Ukraine it was about 
55% during the past ten years. The above indicators suggest that the economic situation perceived by 
the society has been much more favourable in Belarus. 
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Altogether, we conclude that the Ukrainian economy has gone through a longer and more serious 
transitional collapse. 
 
Veress (1999) suggested the calculation of the so-called ‘Misery’ and ‘Unpopularity’ indices to 
examine the relations of economic policy and social contentment/discontent. The Misery Index and the 
Unpopularity Index have positive correlation with social discontent, therefore it can be regarded as a 
rudimentary numerical technique for them. 
 
Contrary to previous data, in the case of these indices one cannot see a considerable dissimilarity 
between the figures of the two countries. The extremely high values and turbulent behaviour of the 
indicators are due to the hyperinflation. Using the present weighting scheme, the misery and 
unpopularity indices tend to disregard the importance of economic growth and unemployment rate, 
because the extent of their change is overwhelmed by the enormous inflation rates. Thus, the above 
indices have proved to be inappropriate for the comparison of the two countries (see Table 2.). 
 
The social costs in the transitional countries were unexpectedly large in the early 1990s (Ellman 1994; 
Nelson 1997). The development of the standard of living is an important terminant of a regime’s 
legitimacy. 
 
Let us review some of the social indicators to see if there are any differences between the countries 
which might help us understand the significant difference in the protesting activities. 
 
In Ukraine, the average life expectancy at birth was 69.5 years in 2005, which falls short of the 70.1 
level of the 1970’s. In Belarus, the average life expectancy at birth was 69.9 years in 2002, which is 
lower than the 71.5 years indicated in the first half of the 1970s. Government spending on health is 
4.8% in Belarus and 2.9% in Ukraine in relation to the GDP. Healthcare spending (public and private) 
on purchasing power parity is USD 464 per capita in Belarus while only USD 176 in Ukraine. The 
percentage of malnourished population is 3% in Belarus but 4% in Ukraine, according to UN data. 
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Public spending on education is 6% of GDP in Belarus, and 4.2% in Ukraine. The number of landline 
phones per 1000 inhabitants was 299 in Belarus and 216 in Ukraine; the number of internet users was 
81.6 and 18 respectively. 
 
In the early 1990s the Human Development Index (HDI) started to decline in both countries (see 
Figure 2.), with Ukrainian figures starting from a higher level, and declining faster than in Belarus. 
This trend halted in 1995; the HDI index in that year was 0.753 for Ukraine and 0.748 for Belarus. 
Since then, both countries have shown some improvement, but while the level of Belarusian HDI 
index in 2004 was above the 0.788 index of 1990, Ukraine at 0.774 was still below the 0.788 in 1990 
(UNDP 2006). 
 
The figures, and especially the macroeconomic data, are rather surprising. It is clear that there has 
been a considerable decline in the standards of living; though social damage was smaller in Belarus. 
Apart from the oppressing nature of the political system, this economic factor, albeit to a lesser extent, 
is the cause of the weaker articulation of social discontent in Belarus. 
 
The possibilities and limits of articulation in Ukraine and Belarus 
 
Now that we have explored the tensions in society, let us survey the ways society could articulate their 
dissatisfaction towards the elites in Ukraine and Belarus through the means of elections and civil 
movements. In our review we will focus on these forums in order to shed light on the 
democratic/antidemocratic responses of the elites and the affinity of society to use these channels. 
 
The quality of institutions and procedures in connection with political transformations is presented on 
a numerical scale by the yearly publication of Freedom House (see Table 3.).3 
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The figures shed light on the suppressive, antidemocratic character of the Belarusian regime, and on 
the fact that the possibilities of articulating discontent against the political leadership are far larger in 
Ukraine. 
 
In our review of Ukraine the emphasis will be on the months of the Orange Revolution. In this country 
of 50 million inhabitants, the number of anomalies and abuses surrounding elections proceedings had 
been on a rise since the latter half of the 1990s4, which meant that the voters had been restricted in 
expressing their will, but all this changed during the Orange Revolution in 2004. Although a 
constitutional reform passed in 2003 allowed the then President Leonid Kuchma to run for the 
Presidency, which is the most influential position in the country, for the third time, he declined this in 
2004. Thus, the two contestants for the seat were Viktor Yanukovych (prime minister 2002-2004), and 
Viktor Yushchenko (prime minister 1999-2001). Nationalism became a significant factor in the 
political system in Ukraine in the 1990s (Pirie 1996). While Yanukovych was supported by the so-
called Donetsk-Clan and the Russian-speaking population, and was regarded as the heir of Kuchma; 
Yushchenko, in the colours of the Our Ukraine bloc and backed mostly by the Ukrainian-speaking 
population of the west of the country and other western countries, urged a more pro-western approach 
as well as promised strict anti-corruption measures and market reforms if elected. 
 
The first round of Ukraine’s presidential election was held on 31st October 2004 with a record-
breaking 75.5% turnout, the highest in the history of independent Ukraine. Yushchenko gained 
39.87% of the votes, while Yanukovych got 39.32% (Beichelt and Pavlenko 2005). Despite the 
presidential election reform bill of 18 March 2004, which, for example, allowed each of the parties to 
delegate 2 representatives to each of the local polling-station committees where they had candidates; 
there were a great number of concerns about the electoral process and the fairness of the elections. 
Through channels of the public administration, pressure was put on both private and public sector 
employees, students and teachers alike to vote for, and even to campaign for, the candidates supported 
by the outgoing president Kuchma. The media was also heavily biased towards Yanukovych; he 
featured more prominently than the other 22(!) cand
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exclusively appeared in a negative light. In addition to this, the Russian-speaking TV channels, 
available in most parts of the country, lobbied intensively for Yanukovych. On top of it all, President 
Putin visited Ukraine a couple of days before both rounds of the election in order to be seen with 
Yanukovych and gain more votes for him. At least 15 of the 23 candidates were only “technical” 
aspirants for the presidential seat with links to Yanukovych. With no independent programme or 
campaign, they agitated for the person and programme of Yanukovych, thereby decreasing the time 
Yushchenko could appear in the media. These candidates further infringed the independency of the 
polling station committees, through their representatives (Freedom House 2005b). Finally, under 
mysterious circumstances, Yushchenko suffered dioxin-poisoning in September. It is little short of a 
miracle that he survived, with dioxin-levels 2200-6600 times the normal concentration in his body, but 
the scars are visible on his face to this day. 
 
The run-off was held on 21 November, with an 80.4% turnout and after counting the ballots Viktor 
Yanukovich seemed to have won, gaining 49.46% of the votes against the “mere” 46.61% of votes 
gained by Yushchenko. Foreign observers complained of serious frauds, especially in the Donetsk 
region5, the hinterland of Yanukovych. Meanwhile, supporters of Yushchenko organised mass 
demonstrations in Kiev and demanded new elections because of vote-rigging. Donning the orange 
colour of the Our Ukraine bloc, the protesters had also found the symbol of solidarity. Due to the 
internal and external pressure, the Ukrainian Supreme Court annulled the results of the run-off on 3 
December and the re-run of the second round was held on 26 December. International observers 
praised the conduct of the vote, which was won by Viktor Yushchenko with 51.99% to 44.2% of the 
votes. With this, the presidential system had also ended, as a constitutional reform in 2004 extended 
the jurisdiction of the parliament. Starting from the elections in March 2006, the president does not 
have the right to appoint the prime minister, and the once formal general elections have suddenly had 
high-stakes, so much so, that Ukrainian politics spent most of 2005 preparing for the elections. 
 
Civil movements and organisations played an important role in the Orange Revolution as most of the 
society could not express their own will until 2004 due to the unfairness of the elections. The 
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popularity of NGOs can be seen from their rising numbers: in 1995 there were only 4,000, in 2000 
30,000 and by 2004 there were 37,000 non-governmental organisations in Ukraine. The legal 
framework for non-profit activities is still undefined; therefore they are not eligible for government 
funds and cannot delegate representative to polling station committees, nevertheless, after all their 
activities, except donations and membership fees, they have to pay taxes like profit-orientated 
companies. Almost 60% of NGOs support themselves from international and mostly western aids, 
which is why they are eyed suspiciously by many in the parliament. A parliamentary committee in 
2004 examining the operation of NGOs decided that western organisations threaten the security of 
Ukraine through these NGOs (Freedom House 2005a and 2005b). 
 
The authoritarian political system of Belarus can be identified with the name of President Alexander 
Lukashenko, who has started his third term of office since his election in 1994. His presidential career 
started when in 1994 the president of the Supreme Council, Stanislav Shushkevich (in power 1991-
1994), was removed from office on corruption charges. Instead of Prime Minister Kebich, the winner 
of the first presidential election of the newly independent Belarus was, by a landslide (45.1% in the 
first and 80.1% in the second round), Lukashenko with a leftist, anti-corruption programme. He owed 
much of his success to the price liberalisation of 1992 and the commencement of privatisation in 1993. 
These, together with high inflation and unemployment rates made his programme, promising the 
security and comfort of the past, appealing in the eyes of many. His presidency – which was called 
“sultanism” by Eke and Kuzio (2000) – brought forth the destruction of the already weak democratic 
establishment, and resulted in the international press dubbing the political system of Belarus as “the 
last post-Soviet stronghold of Stalinism”. During the first years of his presidency he called of 
privatisation, gradually established a centralised governance of the economy, and did not let disparity 
in society grow. Thus, he had strengthened his basis by introducing measures in the perceivable 
economy. 
 
Lukashenko also tried to ward off any possible protests. A milestone in achieving total presidential 
power was the 1996 referendum, which amended the constitution so that the government became 
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totally dependent on the president. His power was further enhanced by the general election in 2000 
(boycotted by the opposition), the 2001 presidential election, and the 2003 local election. At these 
latest local elections the candidates of the opposition gained a mere 1% of the votes (Freedom House 
2004). Elections are only formal ceremonies now, marred by the harassment of the opposition-leaders, 
arrests and the bias of the state-owned media (Amnesty International 2004). 
 
At the 2004 referendum to lift the constitutional ban on running for the presidency for the third time, 
more than 77% of the electorate voted in favour of the constitutional change, although both the 
opposition and international observes declared the referendum unfair. Lukashenko managed to retain 
his power in the March 2006 presidential election, gaining 86.2% of the votes. Today, parliament and 
local governments are all but weightless, and public administration leans heavily on the old 
nomenclature. 
 
As the presidential power grew stronger, the opposition became increasingly marginalised. The lack of 
public sphere, retaliation against the critics of the government, the trials based on fabricated charges, 
the forceful suppression of protests and demonstrations have practically eliminated the opposition 
since the mid 1990s. Some of the leaders and activists of the opposition, among them Yuri 
Zakharenko, former Interior Minister, have disappeared (Amnesty International 2004). Zianon 
Pazniak, leader of the Belarusian People’s Front chose to leave the country and was granted political 
asylum in the United States (Belarus Miscellany 2005). 
 
The government has waged war on independent or pro-opposition NGOs and the media. There are no 
independent unions anymore: the arrests of their leaders and the monopoly of the state-controlled 
“unions” have made the democratic enforcement of workers’ interests practically impossible. The 
Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus, led by Leonid Kozik, has become a puppet of the government. 
The Federation was the official “initiator” of the 2004 referendum. The unions of independent 
industries (the automotive and agricultural machine manufacturers) refused the new leadership of the 
Federation, and tried to retain their independence. The government, in response to this, formed new 
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trade unions in these sectors by legislation integrated the “renitent” sectors into the Federation (ILO 
2004). Those leaders of the Unions who dared protest or speak out against the measures of the 
government were arrested for a while (Freedom House 2004a). 
 
A similar tendency can be seen among NGOs: the loyal organisations are supported both financially 
and by the media, while independent NGOs have been marginalised and put in an impossible situation, 
usually by some fabricated reason (Freedom House 2004a). 
 
Independent media has also been in an increasingly difficult situation. The only independent radio 
station was banned in 1996 and the bank accounts of about half a dozen independent papers were 
frozen. In 2003, the major independent daily, Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, was banned for three 
months and the broadcast of the most popular Belarusian-speaking television channel was suspended. 
The new law on mass communication permits the censorship of the internet, too. Apart from the 
above-mentioned, the ways of oppressing the independent media and rewarding the loyal media are 
extensive: ranging from the far-reaching licences of the Ministry of Information to the different cost of 
publishing and the government funds. As a result of all these, circulation of Narodnaya Volya, an 
independent daily newspaper has diminished from 80,000 in the mid-90s to 30,000 in the first years of 
the new century, although the circulation of the major pro-government daily also decreased from 
430,000 to 270,000 between 2001 and 2003 (Freedom House 2004a) which shows the passive 
alienation from politics and the official propaganda. 
 
The problems of transition have often led to nationalism in the post-communist countries But in 
Belarus, where the national identity has been historically quite weak (Burant 1995). The official 
ideology (a peculiar populist-pragmatist mixture of Soviet nostalgia, conservatism, nationalism and 
anti-westernism) has questioned the independence of the educational and scientific spheres. In 
education, emphasis is put on teaching ideology and as for scientific works; they must always express 
the official standpoint. In some educational institutions the leaders supporting the opposition have 
been removed. As a result of an increasingly open Russification, only 8% of secondary school children 
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attend Belarusian-speaking schools (Freedom House 2004a), while only 3% of broadcast by the 
Belarusian state television is in Belarusian. 
 
The repressive political system does not allow much room for the articulation of discontent, and 
inhibits the demand for political and economic changes. Therefore this can be regarded as one of the 
most important obstacles of transition. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Following the transformational shock, there is some convergence traceable between the 
macroeconomic figures (growth rate, inflation rate and unemployment rate) of Ukraine and Belarus. 
The political systems of the two countries, however, are more divergent than convergent nowadays. 
Ukraine has embarked on a rapid democratization process, while in Belarus, in an increasing number 
of areas, the democratic efforts are being cracked down upon. 
 
The convergence of these macroeconomic data must be put into perspective from the three points. 
Firstly, most of the post-socialist countries are over the transformational recession already, therefore 
the improvement and convergence of the economic indicators is almost a necessity, though there are a 
lot of different tendencies in the political systems (parliamentary, semi-presidential, presidential or 
authoritarian) in the Eastern-European region at the moment. In other words, the similarity in the 
political systems, like Minsk and Kiev, is not necessary. 
 
Secondly, Belarus got over the transformational shock sooner than other countries; due largely to 
administrative interference and external (mainly Russian – see Kuzio 2001b) economic aid, which also 
meant that the rapid swing over the recession and the improvements in the perceivable economy 
helped the Belarusian political elite retain and strengthen its positions (voting system, media, civil 
society). 
 
 18 
This leads us to the third point: the experiments with market economy reforms in Ukraine resulted in 
recent years in an economic performance slightly worse than that of Belarus, but in the medium and 
long run they might lead to a relatively more sustainable and healthier economic growth path, which 
could in turn strengthen the positions of the Ukrainian political elite. 
 
To regard the social and economic transformation as an elite-led process does not offer endless 
possibilities to the elite, rather it offers alternatives. The recent collapses of the post-Soviet, Eastern-
European political systems have had a number of reasons. In the case of Belarus, the reasons helping 
Lukashenko stay in power are the complete lack of democracy, the brutal oppressive nature of the 
political system, the support of Russia, and the (relative) alleviation of social damages. The 
authoritarian power of Lukashenko is based on two pillars: the administrative (but not at all market-
friendly) economic policy, prioritising on the indicators of the perceived economy, and the actions 
aiming to reduce the channels of the articulation people can use to express social discontent. The 
power of Europe’s last dictator depends on these two pillars, but Lukashenko and those around him 
will have a major role in shaping these pillars. 
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Endnotes 
1
 Based on their article, we consider the circulation of elites as the emergence of new people of 
different social classes. The elite reproduction is a process which does not change the social 
composition of the elite. 
2
 With the maintenance and amendment of the perceived economy’s indicators, the Hungarian Kádár 
regime has managed to achieve a certain level of social satisfaction; the structural distortions and 
imbalances were hidden from the society until the beginning of the transition. Thus, the factors of the 
percieved economy can differ from the real state of the economy during a considerable period of time. 
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Certainly, this cannot apply automatically for the period of our research: in case of both countries, the 
collapse in the indicators of the percieved economy was remarkable. 
3
 The method of choosing and using Freedom House indices could be problematic. However, we do 
not consider it a relevant or cardinal problem in this study, because we accept Havrylyshyn’s and van 
Rooden’s results who showed that there is strong correlation between the similar insitutional indices of 
different institutes (EBRD, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Euromoney) (see Havrylyshyn and 
van Rooden 2001). 
4 Leonid Kuchma has gained power through a relatively fair competition against Leonid Kravchuk in 
1994, but during the following parliamentary elections and the presidental elections in 1999 he did not 
recoil from using unfair tools. 
5
 There have been four election districts with 100% turnout, and Yanukovych has won in all of them, 
with a result of 97-99%. 
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Figure 1. GDP Growth in Belarus and Ukraine in Constant Price Level (year-on-year, percentage) 
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Figure 2. A Human Development Index in Ukraine and Belarus (1990-2004) 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Inflation, Price Level, Economic Growth and Unemployment in Belarus and Ukraine (1992-
2007) 
Year Rate of inflation (%) Price level (1992=1) 
GDP growth, 
constant prices (%) 
Registered 
unemployment rate 
(end of year) 
  Belarus Ukraine Belarus Ukraine Belarus Ukraine Belarus Ukraine 
1992 970.3 1,210.0 1.0 1.0 -9.6 -9.7 0.5 n/a 
1993 1,190.2 4,734.9 12.0 48.6 -7.6 -14.2 1.4 0.4 
1994 2,220.9 891.2 270.0 481.6 -11.7 -22.9 2.1 0.4 
1995 709.3 376.4 2,186.0 2 294.1 -11.3 -12.2 2.9 0.6 
1996 52.7 80.2 3,337.0 4 134.7 2.8 -10.0 4.0 1.5 
1997 63.8 15.9 5,466.0 4 791.5 11.4 -3.0 2.8 2.7 
1998 73.0 10.6 9,456.0 5 298.3 8.4 -1.9 2.3 4.3 
1999 293.7 22.7 37,230.0 6 500.1 3.4 -0.2 2.1 5.5 
2000 168.6 28.2 100,000.0 8 333.3 5.8 5.9 2.1 5.5 
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2001 61.1 12.0 161,133.0 9 329.9 4.7 9.2 2.3 4.8 
2002 42.6 0.8 229,723.0 9 400.6 5.0 5.2 3.0 5.0 
2003 28.4 5.2 294,960.0 9 890.3 7.0 9.6 3.1 4.8 
2004 18.1 9.0 348,330.0 10 784.3 11.4 12.1 1.9 4.8 
2005 10.3 13.5 384,334.0 12 241.6 9.3 2.6 1.5  1.3 
2006 7.9 9.3 414,696.4 13 380.1 7.0 5.0 n/a  n/a  
2007 9.0 13.5 452,019.1 15 186.4 4.5 2.8 n/a  n/a  
Sources: Inflation, economic growth: IMF (2006) 
Price level: own calculation based on IMF (2006)  
Unemployment: ILO (2007) 
 
Table 2. Indices about Social Judgement of Economic Policy in Ukraine and Belarus (1992-2007) 
Year Misery indexa Unpopularity indexb 
 Belarusia Ukraine  Belarusia Ukraine  
1992 970.8  999,1 1 239.1 
1993 1 191.6 4 735.3 1 213.0 4 777.5 
1994 2 223.0 891.6 2 256.0 959.9 
1995 712.2 377.0 743.2 413.0 
1996 56.7 81.7 44.3 110.2 
1997 66.6 18.6 29.6 24.9 
1998 75.3 14.9 47.8 16.3 
1999 295.8 28.2 283.5 23.3 
2000 170.7 33.7 151.2 10.5 
2001 63.4 16.8 47.0 -15.6 
2002 45.6 5.8 27.6 -14.8 
2003 31.5 10.0 7.4 -23.6 
2004 20.0 13.8 -16.1 -27.3 
2005 11.8 14.8 -17.6 5.7 
2006   -13.1 -5.7 
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2007   -4.5 5.1 
Sources: IMF (2006) and ILO (2007) 
a
 Misery index = inflation rate + unemployment rate 
b
 Unpopularity index = inflation rate – 3GDP growth 
 
Table 3. Political indices in Ukraine and Belarus (1997-2006)a 
Categories Country 1997 1998 1999-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
BEL 6.00 6.25 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00 7.00 
Election process 
UKR 3.25 3.50 3.50 4.00 4.50 4.00 4.25 3.50 3.25 
BEL 5.25 5.75 6.00 6.50 6.25 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 
Civil society 
UKR 4.00 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.75 3.00 2.75 
BEL 6.25 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 Independent 
media UKR 4.50 4.75 5.00 5.25 5.50 5.50 5.50 4.75 3.75 
BEL 6.00 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.50 6.50 6.50 n/a n/a 
Governance 
UKR 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25 n/a n/a 
BEL 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 Administration of 
justice UKR 3.75 4.00 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.75 4.25 4.25 
BEL n/a n/a 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.50 5.75 6.00 6.25 
Corruption 
UKR n/a n/a 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 
BEL 5.90 6.20 6.25 6.38 6.38 6.46 6.54 6.64 6.71 
Democracy 
UKR 4.00 4.25 4.63 4.71 4.92 4.71 4.88 4.50 3.96 
Sources: Freedom House (2006a) and Freedom House (2006b) 
a
 The score of 1 signifies the features which characterize an established democracy the most, and 7 is 
the value of the least characteristic ones. Each figure refers to the previous year, for example data for 
2006 refers to the period between the 1st January 2005 and the 31th December 2005. 
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